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1 Introduction
The theory of cooperative fuzzy games started with work of Aubin (1974,
1981), where special attention is paid to the core concept. Other interesting
multi−valued solutions for cooperative fuzzy games are the Weber set, the
participation monotonic allocation schemes (cf. Brânzei et al., 2002), the
fuzzy population monotonic allocation schemes (cf. Tsurumi et al., 2001), the
fuzzy version of the Milnor set of reasonable payoﬀs for crisp games (Milnor,
1952) and the path solution cover, which we introduce in this paper.
Much work has been done in developing one−point solution concepts of
cooperative fuzzy games. Shapley values as one−point solution concept for
this kind of games are studied in Aubin (1974, 1981), Butnariu (1978), But-
nariu and Klement (1993), Tsurumi et al. (2001). In Molina and Tejada
(2002), and Sakawa and Nishizaki (1994) the equalizer and the lexicograph-
ical solutions are considered. We enlarge the existing literature concerning
one−point solution concepts for cooperative fuzzy games with compromise
values.
In the theory of cooperative crisp games these values (cf. Tijs, 1981;
Tijs and Lipperts, 1982; Tijs and Otten, 1993; Bergantiños and Massó, 1996;
van den Brink, 1994, 2002; van Heumen, 1984) arise as feasible compromises
between upper and lower bounds of the core. Inspired by this literature,
the objectives of this paper are on one hand to introduce upper and lower
2bounds for the core, the Weber set and the path solution cover of fuzzy
g a m e s ,a n do nt h eo t h e rh a n dt od e ﬁne compromise values based on these
bounds. Special attention will be given to relations between these bounds
and compromise values for the class of convex fuzzy games, introduced in
Brânzei et al. (2002).
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we recall some no-
tions and facts from the theory of cooperative fuzzy games. Path solutions
and their convex hull, the path solution cover, are introduced in Section 3.
For fuzzy games with a non−empty core, hypercubes catching the core, the
Weber set and the path solution cover and related compromise values are
deﬁned and studied in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
2 Preliminaries
Given the set N = {1,2,...,n} of players, a fuzzy coalition is a vector s ∈
[0,1]
N.T h ei−th coordinate si of s is called the participation level of player i
in the fuzzy coalition s. Instead of [0,1]
N we will also write FN for the set of
fuzzy coalitions. A fuzzy game with player set N is a map v : FN → < with
the property v(0,0,...,0) = 0. The map assigns to each fuzzy coalition s a
real number v(s), telling what such a coalition can achieve in cooperation.
The set of fuzzy games with player set N will be denoted by FG N.T h ecore
























i =0if i ∈ N \S. The fuzzy coalition eN is called the grand
3coalition because all players are present with full participation level 1.T h e
family of fuzzy games on N with a non−e m p t yc o r ei sd e n o t e db yFG N
∗ .
A special subclass of FG N
∗ is the class of convex fuzzy games introduced
in Brânzei et al. (2002). Here v ∈ FG N is called convex iﬀ v satisﬁes the
increasing average marginal return (IAMR) property, i.e. for each s1,s 2 ∈ FN
with s1 ≤ s2 and ε1,ε2 ∈ <+ with s1
i + ε1 ≤ s2
































For each ordering σ of N the marginal vector mσ(v) for v ∈ FG N is
deﬁned as follows. For i = σ(k) the i−th coordinate mσ















The Weber set W(v) for fuzzy games (cf. Brânzei et al., 2002) is deﬁned
by W(v)=conv {mσ(v) | σ is an ordering of N}, the convex hull of the n!
marginal vectors. It is proved there (Theorem 7) that
C(v)=W(v) for each convex game v ∈ FG
N. (2)
3 Path solutions and the path solution cover
Let us consider in the hypercube [0,1]
N of fuzzy coalitions paths, which
connect (0,0,...,0) with eN =( 1 ,1,...,1) in a special way.
Formally, a sequence π = hp0,p 1,p 2,...,p mi of m +1diﬀerent points in
FN will be called a path (of length m)i n[0,1]
N if
(i) p0 =( 0 ,0,...,0),a n dpm =( 1 ,1,...,1);
(ii) pk ≤ pk+1 for each k ∈ {0,1,2,...,m− 1};
4(iii)f o re a c hk ∈ {0,1,2,...,m− 1},t h e r ei so n ep l a y e ri ∈ N (the

















For a path π = hp0,p 1,p 2,...,p mi l e tu sd e n o t eb yPi(π) the set of points








i.G i v e n a g a m e
v ∈ FG N and a path π,t h ep a y o ﬀ vector xπ(v) ∈ <N corresponding to v












G i v e ns u c hap a t hhp0,p 1,p 2,...,p mi of length m and v ∈ FG N,o n ec a n
imagine the situation, where the players in N, starting from non−cooperation




in m steps, where in each step
one of the players increases his participation level. If the increase in value in
such a step is given to the acting player, the resulting aggregate payoﬀsl e a d
to the vector xπ(v)=( xπ







.W ec a l lxπ(v) a path solution.
L e tu sd e n o t eb yP(N) the set of paths in [0,1]
N. T h e nw ed e n o t eb y




n | π ∈ P(N)}.
Note that all paths π ∈ P(N) have length at least n.T h e r ea r en! paths
with length exactly n; each of these paths corresponds to a situation where
one by one the players − say in the order σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(n)− increase their
participation from level 0 to level 1. Let us denote such a path along n edges













σ) | σ is an ordering of N} ⊂ P(v).
In Brânzei et al. (2002) it was proved that the core of a fuzzy game is a
subset of the Weber set. Hence
Proposition 1 For each v ∈ FG N we have C(v) ⊂ W(v) ⊂ P(v).
Example 1 Let v ∈ FG {1,2} be given by v(s1,s 2)=s1 (s2)
2 + s1 +2 s2




















































P(v). The two shortest paths of length 2 given by π(1,2) = h(0,0),(1,0),(1,1)i
and π(2,1) = h(0,0),(0,1),(1,1)i have payoﬀ vectors m(1,2)(v)=( 1 ,3),
m(2,1)(v)=( 2 ,2), respectively.
4 H y p e r c u b e sa sc a t c h e r so fs e t so fp a y o ﬀ
vectors for fuzzy games




N | ai ≤ xi ≤ bi for each i ∈ N
o
,
where a,b ∈ <N,a ≤ b (and the order ≤ is the standard partial order in
<N). The vectors a and b are called bounding vectors of the hypercube [a,b],
where, more explicitly, a is called the lower vector and b the upper vector of
[a,b]. Given a set A ⊂ <N we say that the hypercube [a,b] is a catcher of A
if A ⊂ [a,b],a n d[a,b] is called a tight catcher of A if there is no hypercube
strictly included in [a,b] which also catches A.
6A hypercube of reasonable outcomes for a crisp game plays a role in
Milnor (1952) (cf. Gerard-Varet and Zamir, 1987) and this hypercube can
be seen as a tight catcher of the Weber set for crisp games. Also in Tijs
(1981) and Tijs and Lipperts (1982) hypercubes are considered which are
catchers of the core of crisp games.
The objective of this section is to introduce and study catchers of the
core, the Weber set and the path solution cover.
Let us ﬁrst introduce a core catcher
HC(v)=[ l(C(v)),u(C(v))]
for a game v ∈ FG N
∗ ,w h e r ef o re a c hk ∈ N :
























| ε ∈ (0,1]
o
.
Proposition 2 For each v ∈ FG N
∗ and each k ∈ N :
−∞ <l k (C(v)) ≤ uk (C(v)) < ∞ and C(v) ⊂ HC(v).
Proof. Take x ∈ C(v).





























; hence xk ≤ uk (C(v)) < ∞.













| ε ∈ (0,1]
o
= lk (C (v)) > −∞.
7(i)a n d( ii) imply the inequalities in the proposition and the fact that
HC(v) is a catcher of C(v).
N o ww ei n t r o d u c ef o re a c hv ∈ FG N
∗ af u z z yv a r i a n tHW(v) of the
hypercube of reasonable outcomes of Milnor (1952),
HW(v)=[ l(W(v)),u(W(v))],
where for each k ∈ N :
































Proposition 3 For each v ∈ FG N
∗ the hypercube HW(v) is a tight catcher
of W(v).
Proof. Left to the reader.
Theorem 4 Let v ∈ FG N
∗ be a convex game. Then HC(v)=HW(v) and
this hypercube is a tight catcher for C(v)=W(v).F u r t h e r
















for each k ∈ N.
Proof. From (1) it follows that for a convex game v ∈ FG N


































for each S ⊂ N \{ k}.
So, we obtain




























| S ⊂ N \{ k}
o
= lk (W(v)).
Similarly, from (1) it follows





































| S ⊂ N \{ k}
o
= uk (W(v)).
This implies that HC(v)=HW(v).
That this hypercube is a tight catcher of C(v)=W(v) (see (2)) follows






















where σ and τ are orderings of N with σ(1) = k and τ(n)=k, respectively.
For convex fuzzy games this theorem has consequences with respect to
the coincidence of some of the compromise values, which will be introduced
in the next section (see Theorem 7).
Let us call a set [a,b] with a ≤ b and a ∈ (< ∪ {−∞})
N and b ∈
(< ∪ {∞})
N a generalized hypercube.
Now we introduce for v ∈ FG N
∗ the generalized hypercube
HP(v)=[ l(P(v)),u(P(v))],
9w h i c hc a t c h e st h ep a t hs o l u t i o nc o v e rP(v) as we see in Theorem 5 (i), where
for k ∈ N :












| s ∈ F
N,s k < 1,ε ∈ (0,1 − sk]
o
,












| s ∈ F
N,s k < 1,ε ∈ (0,1 − sk]
o
where lk (P(v)) ∈ [−∞,∞) and uk (P(v)) ∈ (−∞,∞].N o t et h a tu(P(v)) ≥
u(C(v)), l(P(v)) ≤ l(C(v)).
Theorem 5 (i) For v ∈ FG N
∗ , HP(v) is a catcher of P(v).














for each k ∈ N are the right and left partial
derivative in the direction ek in 0 and eN, respectively.








































i (v) ≥ li (P(v)).
(ii) From (1) for a convex game it follows that








































105 Compromise values for fuzzy games
I nT i j s( 1 9 8 1 )bo u n d sf o rt h ec o r eo fac r i s pg a m e( c f .T i j sa n dL i p p e r t s ,1 9 8 2 )
were used to introduce two compromise values for such games, the σ−value
and the τ−value. For a survey on compromise values for crisp games we refer
to Tijs and Otten (1993).
Inspired by this work we want to introduce for fuzzy games compromise
values of σ−type and of τ−type for each of the solution sets C(v),W(v)
and P(v).I n t h e ﬁr s tt y p eu s ei sm a d ed i r e c t l yo ft h eb o u n d i n gv e c t o r s
of HC(v),HW(v) and HP(v), while in the τ−type compromise values the
upper vector is used together with a so−called remainder vector derived from
the upper vector.
To start with the ﬁrst type, consider a hypercube [a,b] in <N and a
v ∈ FG N













T h e nt h e r ei sau n i q u ep o i n tc(a,b) on the line through a and b which






.S o c(a,b) is the
convex combination of a and b,w h i c hi se ﬃcient. We call c(a,b) the feasible
compromise between a and b.












if the generalized hypercube HP(v) is a hypercube.
11Note that
∅ 6= C(v) ⊂ HC(v) ⊂ HW(v) ⊂ HP(v), (3)
so all hypercubes contain eﬃcient vectors and the ﬁrst two compromise value
vectors are always well deﬁned. In this paper we will not deal with properties
and axiomatic characterizations of the values; for such a task Tijs (1987) can
be a useful guide.
For the τ−like compromise values we need to deﬁne so−called remainder
vectors with the aid of a fuzzy version of the maximal remainder map Mv :
<N → <N f o rac r i s pg a m e . T h el a t t e rw a sd e ﬁned in Driessen and Tijs
(1985), inspired by the work of Bennett and Wooders (1979). The fuzzy
version mv : <N → <N of Mv for v ∈ FG N















 | s ∈ F




for each i ∈ N and each z ∈ <N.
The following proposition shows that mv assigns to each upper bound z
of the core (i.e. z ≥ x for each x ∈ C(v)) a lower bound mv(z) of the core,
called the remainder vector corresponding to z.
Proposition 6 Let v ∈ FG N
∗ and let z ∈ <N be an upper bound of C(v).
Then mv(z) is a lower bound of C(v).
Proof. Take i ∈ N and x ∈ C(v).W eh a v et op r o v et h a tmv
i(z) ≤ xi.F o r




























sj (xj − zj) ≤ xi,
12where the ﬁrst inequality follows from x ∈ C(v) and the second inequality
from the fact that z is an upper bound for C(v),a n dt h e nz ≥ x. Hence
mv
i(z) ≤ xi for each i ∈ N,s omv(z) is a lower bound for C(v).
Now we are able to introduce the τ−like compromise values taking into ac-
count that all upper vectors of HC(v),HW(v) and HP(v) are upper bounds
for the core of v ∈ FG N
∗ as follows from (3).















if the generalized hypercube HP(v) is a hypercube.
T h ec o m p r o m i s ev a l u evalτ
C(v) is in the spirit of the τ−value of Tijs
(1981) for crisp games, and the compromise value valτ
W(v) is in the spirit of
the χ−value of Bergantiños and Massó (1996), the µ−value of van Heumen
(1984) and one of the values of van den Brink (1994, 2002) for crisp games,
which all three coincide.
Theorem 7 Let v ∈ FG N be a convex game. Then
(i) mv
k (u(C(v))) = mv














































 | s ∈ F






































































Now, note that for each t ∈ {2,...,n}, the increasing average marginal




















































from which (4) follows.
(ii)S i n c e ,b y( i)a n dT h e o r e m4 ,lk (C(v)) = mv










Remark 1 Let v ∈ FG N be a convex game. Because u(P(v)) ≥ u(C(v)),i t




for each k ∈ N. But this remainder vector is in general not equal to Dv(0)
(see Theorem 5), so in general valτ
P(v) and valσ
P(v) do not coincide.
14for each k ∈ N.
Example 2 Consider the two−person convex fuzzy game with v(s1,s 2)=
s1 (s2)





= conv {(0,1),(1,0)} and HC(v)=HW(v)=
































W(v).F u r t h e r ,
valτ
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